Uncertainty surrounds the peace negotiations in Afghanistan due to an inability to reconcile the Taliban’s demands with those of Kabul and the West.
Background
At a news conference on 15 February 2021, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg asked the Taliban to reduce the violence in Afghanistan, saying that the withdrawal of allied troops would be contingent on the situation on the ground. He added that the allies’ common goal was to keep Afghanistan from serving as a haven from which terrorists could launch attacks on foreign lands. He noted, further, that no ally country wanted to stay in Afghanistan longer than was necessary.
Comment
On 5 January 2021, in Doha, under the auspices of the US, the second round of the dialogue began between the Taliban and the Kabul regime took place. The negotiations collapsed soon, however, because US President Joseph Biden wanted to review the US-Taliban Doha Accord, which was signed on 29 February on the understanding that the Taliban would fulfil their commitments, such as observing a cease-fire with the Afghan forces and engaging in meaningful negotiations with the government in Kabul.
Stoltenberg’s concerns are shared by many others. On 22 December 2020, acting US Secretary of Defence Christopher Miller visited Kabul and assured President Ashraf Ghani of Washington’s commitment to bring peace to Afghanistan. According to the Doha Accord, the US had to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by 1 May 2021. Thus, on 15 January 2021, the US reduced the number of its troops to 2,500. Hours later, a group of the Taliban killed more than a dozen members of the Afghan security forces in Herat province. The Taliban High Command’s excuse for the attack was that their field commanders did not always heed their instructions.
Since 2008, US presidents have faced domestic pressure to withdraw US troops and end their 19 year-long military presence in Afghanistan. Various presidents made electoral promises to do so but changed their view when faced with ground realities. On 20 January, President Biden inherited the war. The US cannot withdraw its troops without ensuring the smooth running of the Afghan government under the Afghan Constitution. Kabul’s major goal is to negate the attacks launched by the Taliban. Accordingly, the US administration’s decision to withdraw its troops causes anxiety in Kabul.
The Doha Accord was conditional: the Taliban had to scale down violence to effect a ceasefire and settle their political power-sharing differences with the Kabul regime, failing which the US forces would remain in Afghanistan. The NATO forces would follow suit.
The ceasefire observed by the Taliban is selective: it spares foreign forces but attacks Afghan forces. In December 2020, Commander of US-NATO forces, General Scott Miller, informed the visiting US Secretary of Defence that the Taliban continued to attack Afghan security forces instead of maintaining a truce. On 28 December, the head of the National Directorate of Security, Ahmad Zia Siraj, also informed the Afghan Senate that in the past nine months, the Taliban and other militant organisations had launched 18,200 attacks. Of those, the attacks also targeted civilians, who were subjected to bomb blasts and targeted killings in 99 per cent of the attacks. The prime targets were those who publicly espoused freedom of speech and expression, including writers, human rights activists and journalists, supporters of a democratic and constitutional Afghanistan, and electronic media channels that espoused pro-Western views and lifestyles, including ideas that were at odds with the Taliban’s. The Taliban imposed their conservative views on TV channels through proxy groups. Despite that, led by Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, Afghanistan’s High Council for National Reconciliation showed its willingness to enter into negotiations with the Taliban, who had a political office in Doha, Qatar.
In principle, the Taliban should have valued the Doha Accord. The peace process surrounding the intra-Afghan dialogue had progressed, especially after the prisoner swap to the satisfaction of the Taliban in mid-2020, even though releasing the Taliban prisoners was an imprudent step. On 12 September 2020, the first round of intra-Afghan dialogue began and continued for around two-and-a-half months in Doha. The first round had failed, as the negotiations foundered on certain issues. First, the Taliban wanted to replace the existing title of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Second, the Taliban sought to interpret Islamic jurisprudence in accordance with their conservative beliefs. Third, the Taliban were ready to grant rights to women as per Islamic law (again, in accordance with their own interpretation of those laws), but refused to give women modern rights. Fourth, the Taliban wanted to establish the Shura system to elect and run the government, while discarding general elections. Fifth, the Taliban sought to supplant the Kabul regime altogether instead of entering into a power-sharing formula, such as acting as governors and entering into the parliament through general elections.
On 5 January 2021, the second round of negotiations began in Doha. Like the first round, the second also took place in Doha at the insistence of the Taliban, who were loath to hold talks in Afghanistan, as they considered the Kabul regime to be Western puppets. The prospect of a complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan was predicated on the success of the negotiations, but the Taliban did not fulfil their commitments.
At the moment, there are two main concerns. First, inside Afghanistan, the Taliban are unwilling to negotiate peace terms with the Kabul regime, thus requiring the mediation of a third party. There is inadequate communication between the Taliban and Kabul. That situation is a bad omen for peace and democracy in Afghanistan, especially after foreign forces and mediators leave the country. Second, the Taliban are averse to accepting the Afghan Constitution as a legitimate contract between the rulers and citizens, although a few amendments could accommodate all. The Taliban have demanded the restoration of the Doha negotiations before the collapse of dialogue is formally declared. Subsequently, NATO expects a retaliatory Spring Offensive by the Taliban in March this year.
It is known that the Afghan Government cannot survive without the support of foreign forces. Acquiescing to the Taliban’s demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops before the conclusion of an intra-Afghan agreement would be tantamount to squandering all the time and money that the allies have spent in Afghanistan. Currently, uncertainty continues to surround the peace process.