FutureDirections
      International

Occasional Papers

FDI publishes Occasional Papers which offer an in-depth review of current events in greater detail than what is possible in the Weekly Global Report. Occasional Papers focus on those areas of national importance and are generally self-contained examinations on a number of topics.

FDI Occasional Paper 2

Australia’s National Security: Considerations for Planning Defence and Security Capabilities Well Into the 21st Century

On June 25, 2008, Future Directions International launched its second Occasional Paper which noted that Australia could find more funding for defence equipment, but cannot, at almost any price, find adequate numbers of new recruits. As a result, the study said, preserving the lives, morale, and mission success of defence personnel was one of the highest priorities to be weighed in the forthcoming Government Defence White Paper.

[For a free, downloadable copy of the report scroll to the bottom of this page

The study, entitled Australia’s National Security: Considerations for Planning Defence and Security Capabilities Well Into the 21st Century, also said that Australia must move even more rapidly toward making national security a “whole of nation” affair because “hard power” options – the use of military power – would never be sufficient as an option for Australia.

Gregory Copley AM, the study’s author, noted: “Even though Australia is between the 11th and 13th largest defence spender in the world in absolute terms (depending on the calculating methods being used; it ranks nowhere near this high in terms of the percentage of GDP spent on defence), it still cannot expect to meet its strategic and security needs through reliance on military spending alone.”

“The welfare and security of the nation-state cannot be left solely to a necessarily-small (by international standards) defence force, no matter how innovative and well-equipped it may be,” Mr Copley said.

The study noted as well that it was critical that the Australian security structures obtained a much more professional understanding of terrorism as a phenomenon if it was to be successfully handled. 

It also said that the growing transformation of energy and food supply realities — particularly as global economic cycles peaked and troughed more erratically over coming decades — would particularly impact Australia, as it moved from a period of relative petroleum self-sufficiency to one of overwhelming import dependency within a half-decade. The question, then, of what Australia did to ameliorate or address its energy needs by finding alternate forms of energy would directly impact the degree to which the nation would need to become engaged internationally in military actions to protect its interests.

Thus, Australia’s ability to address domestic and regional energy security issues would directly impact the cost — in human as well as financial terms — of its national security and defence capabilities. Whether Australia had to build an infrastructure (and a foreign policy) to acquire, transport, and process petroleum from the international market for the remaining few decades of the “petroleum era”, or whether Australia devoted its resources to providing domestic answers to its energy needs, would absolutely determine the cost and shape of Australia’s strategic and national security policies.

With regard to its strategic alliances, the FDI study said: “In ANZUS, Australia must increasingly act, and regard itself, as an equal alliance partner and ensure that its voice is heard and its opinion respected.”

The FDI study placed considerable emphasis on the adoption of “force multipliers” – the application of technology and ingenuity – by the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) in order to compensate for its manpower shortage and the relative growth of regional powers. Noting the strong ADF emphasis on this sector, the study also called for greater use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and a far greater commitment to supporting and utilising the Australian scientific, technology, and industrial base.

“Australian economic and security progress will in large part depend on a continued commitment by government (including state governments) and industry to ongoing R&D, and a willingness to support Australian visions of scientific and industrial solutions. The current case of the development of the Scramjet concepts of rocket propulsion by the University of Queensland is a significant example of the Australian approach of applying innovation ahead of budget considerations to finding solutions,” Mr Copley noted.

The study questioned the validity of the approach used to acquire Australia’s new warships – the air-capable landing ships and the air warfare destroyers – while supporting the importance of the mission of these vessels.

It also called for the creation of a more powerful authority within the Department of Defence to manage and coordinate what must, the study said, become an Australian space strategy.

The study also reinforced FDI’s position that Australia’s external territories, including its Antarctic territory, were an increasingly important national asset, and suggested that the ADF deploy permanent basing assets to some of the external territories, particularly the Cocos (Keeling) and Christmas islands.

With regard to the safety and survivability of ADF personnel, the study said: “whatever can be done to ensure the survivability and ongoing mission effectiveness of its forces must be of primary consideration in defence planning. The new initiatives to ensure greater survivability of troops in Australian Army vehicles — from soft-skinned transports to Bushmaster armoured vehicles, M113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and follow-on procurement of an improved ASLAV (Australian Light Armoured Vehicle) — facing landmine or IED (improvised explosive device) attacks must be given high priority, especially in light of new battlefield experience which highlights the seriousness of the threat to life and health of the secondary effects of blast caused by the phenomenon known as ‘slamdown’. It is regrettable that the recent, and expensive, program to upgrade and restore the M113 APCs to service did not address personnel survivability and comfort issues which are critical to mission effectiveness.”

“The ADF has rightly insisted on maintaining quality levels in terms of professionalism and equipment, and this is the key to sustained productivity levels in the Armed Forces. Nonetheless, that route does not offer an infinite capacity for development, and the ADF is already faced with the reality that it cannot recruit sufficient personnel to comfortably perform the missions the Government demands of it.”

“What is significant is that the recruitment of high-calibre personnel and leadership into the ADF is not merely a matter of competing in terms of financial reward or benefits (pay and conditions) with the private sector. It is more a matter of appealing to the instincts of duty, patriotism, comradeship, and participation of certain elements of society. The ability to recruit and retain ideal defence personnel, then, is tightly linked to population strategies which build national unity, prestige, and sense of destiny.”

The list of key findings and recommendations in the report included:

1.   Global and regional security environments will remain unstable for the foreseeable future, for a range of reasons, including the anticipated peaking and subsequent decline of global population figures over the coming decades, and the confluence of a range of economic, scientific, cultural, and sovereignty trends.

2.   The confluence of key strategic trends in the coming decades will require Australia to field a strong mix of conventional, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, and nationbuilding military capabilities. Apart from confirming the long-term move into “unconventional” (and often asymmetric) challenges, there will be a new requirement to build “soft” military capabilities focused around psychological strategy assets which Australia presently lacks.

3.   Australia is losing some of its technology/innovation leadership regionally by virtue of the growth of other regional economies. It must therefore turn even more to the use of force-multipliers, both in terms of technology and in terms of practices. This will call for innovative use of Australia’s own scientific and industrial community. Doctrinal and training development must increasingly become the core Centre of Excellence for the Australian Defence Forces (ADF).

4.   Australia’s most expensive defence capital investments coming into service over the coming few years will provide much of the framework of ADF capabilities to mid-century and beyond.

5.   Australia’s ANZUS alliance with the United States will remain the core alliance for Australia, but Australia will increasingly have to operate alone and/or with other partners on some issues. Australia is no longer a “dependent” or junior partner in the ANZUS alliance, and must comport itself accordingly.

6.   Australia’s changing pattern of energy dependency will in many respects determine the nation’s strategic, security, and military options. The Department of Defence and the ADF need to be participating parties to Australia’s energy and infrastructural planning.

7.   Australia’s External Territories provide a broader footprint for Australia’s strategic and security capabilities than have been considered in the recent past, and should be given higher priority in defence planning in the future, including consideration of token garrisoning of Cocos (Keeling) and Christmas islands.

8.   FDI advocates the creation of a dedicated office within Defence to monitor Australia’s space interests, and to develop and manage Australian strategic approaches to space, including taking a management rôle in Australia’s present Defence-related space communications and COMINT/SIGINT, warning/reconnaissance/imagery, and other assets.

FDI Occasional Paper 2
FDI Occasional Paper 1