Iran: Continuing Nuclear Uncertainty

Indian Ocean SWA Articles

Wednesday, 11 April 2012

Background

A recent statement by a senior Iranian politician that Iran has the technical capacity to build a nuclear weapon but will ‘never do so’, highlights yet again the uncertainty that surrounds Tehran’s nuclear intentions and its ability to develop such a capability.

Comment

Differing public statements by US, European and Israeli officials, together with inconclusive predictions by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reflect this uncertainty. Furthermore, the development of a nuclear weapon is a lengthy and complicated process, which requires several distinct capabilities.

Nor is it clear that public statements necessarily reflect the final intelligence analysis, which will be based on highly classified information that may have been doctored for political purposes.  Statements by US officials, for instance, support the argument that there is still time to determine whether economic sanctions will force Iran’s leaders to halt any nuclear programme. In contrast, Israeli officials state that there is a limited opportunity to strike, as Iran is nearing a ‘zone of immunity’. They claim it could quickly complete the final stages of developing a nuclear weapon in heavily fortified bunkers that could be immune to Israeli airstrikes.

Developing a nuclear weapon requires at least three, and possibly four, stages.

The first stage is to produce weapons-grade uranium. There seems little doubt that Iran has low-enriched uranium but still needs to convert this material into weapons-grade fuel. To do that, it must either reconfigure its existing plants (a move likely to be detected by the IAEA) or build secret sites capable of the task. Iran has a record of doing the latter and only acknowledges the existence of these sites after they have been detected.

The second stage is to design a nuclear warhead by combining electronics and explosives to transform highly enriched uranium into a fission bomb. Most analysts believe that Iran has mastered some, but not all, of these skills.

The third stage is to deliver the nuclear weapon. Most conventional thinking suggests this will be done by means of Iran’s intermediate-range missiles. Certainly, Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and is shortly to test a missile that could launch a satellite. But most analysts believe it is still to face the challenge of getting a bomb that would fit its missiles.  Nor can other possible means be ignored: an aircraft-delivered weapon or one transported by other means – the so-called “nuclear-suitcase option.”

The fourth stage, according to some experts, is that Iran would almost certainly have to test the weapon.

Assuming Iran does develop a nuclear weapon, there is also considerable disagreement as to when this might occur, with estimates ranging from six months to two years.

A major factor in confirming these judgements is the ability of intelligence services to gather relevant information and to interpret such information correctly. There can be little doubt that Iran has been a high priority intelligence target for several years. Equally, however, Iranian officials will have taken counter-measures to protect their intentions and capabilities.

A final and significant judgement, for which there is no clear answer, is whether Tehran actually intends to build a nuclear weapon. While there have been numerous statements that it does not intend to do so, it has not been prepared, at least to the satisfaction of the IAEA and numerous Western countries, to open a number of its sites for inspection.

If there is a bottom line, it is that Tehran does not have nuclear weapons at this time; but whether it intends to build one, and how long this might take, is anything but clear.

Major General John Hartley AO (Retd)

Institute Director and CEO

Future Directions International