Mutiny Tip of the Iceberg in PNG Instability

Wednesday, 01 February 2012

Background

The botched mutiny in Papua New Guinea (PNG) is symptomatic of much larger political issues. PNG bears many of the hallmarks of a failing state. Although calm seems to have returned to Port Moresby for the moment, the latest development in the year-long political crisis bodes poorly for a resolution in the short-term. PNG’s human development indicators are among the worst in the world. While the crisis continues, efforts to resolve social and economic issues will likely be futile. 

Beyond PNG, a chief concern for policy makers is how the crisis may transmit regionally. East Timor and Melanesian states suffer similar insecurities, albeit at a lower intensity than PNG. An indirect security concern also exists for Australia. Instability, leading to state failure, would be disastrous for Australia’s interests in the region and its own northern flank.

Comment

On 26 January, some 30 soldiers led by retired Colonel Yaura Sasa, stormed the Port Moresby barracks and attempted to depose the country’s top defence official. The day-long mutiny, reportedly undertaken at the behest of former Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare, is the latest development in a year-long political crisis. Government troops quickly regained control of the barracks, effectively ending the mutiny. According to reports on 29 January, Colonel Sasa has been arrested, while a general amnesty has been given to the soldiers. Far from resolving the crisis, the coup and its aftermath may herald the start of a divisive and potentially violent period in PNG.

PNG is ethnically, tribally and culturally diverse. This makes it unlikely that the objectives of the mutiny could ever have been realised. Unlike coup-prone Fiji, the military in PNG is not a homogenous entity. Ties and loyalties across tribes effectively prevent support from a broad cross-section of the military. Although future munities are unlikely to succeed, January’s munity has created a dangerous precedent, and further interference by the military cannot be discounted.  

The contentious political environment creates further concerns for elections due in the middle of the year. Election related violence in the 2002 vote claimed over 100 lives. Reprisals from the mutiny, tensions between the current government and Somare’s camp, and ubiquitous tribal tensions, may conspire to create further violence during the 2012 vote. 

Equally, the economic outlook for PNG largely mimics the political uncertainty. On 27 January, Standard and Poor’s, one of the world’s major credit rating agencies, downgraded PNG’s sovereign credit rating from stable to negative. Citing the mutiny, along with political uncertainty, S&P gave the country a B+ credit rating, four levels below investment grade. The downgrade, likely to be followed by other credit agencies, may have a negative impact on donor support. The reduced rating could also decrease foreign investment in the nation’s economically vital resource and energy sector.

Internal instability within states cannot be isolated. Failing states represent a regional security liability. The collapse of Yugoslavia in the early-1990s led to a proliferation of transnational criminal activity. Similarly, the continuing failure of Somalia, and its resulting porous borders, has resulted in a declining security situation throughout the Horn of Africa. The collapse, or continued weakening of PNG would provide a Petri dish for security challenges in the South Pacific. Trafficking in small arms, money laundering, narcotics smuggling and production, are all possible contingencies. Doubts remain over the potential for other regional states to meet these challenges, leading to a potential arc of instability on Australia’s northern borders.

For Australia, a further deterioration of the situation in PNG would signify a real and immediate security concern. The proximity of PNG, 160 kilometres north of Australia, is a motivating concern in formulating policy toward the crisis. Australia’s economic interests, mainly in natural gas and mineral resources, may also be undermined if the current situation is not resolved. According to Elsina Wainwright, a strategic dimension exists in Australia’s response to state failure in the South Pacific. Failing or failed states are vulnerable to funds from state or non-state actors wishing to create a presence in Australia’s immediate region. A continuing decline in the stability of PNG presents opportunities for the involvement of actors with interests potentially opposed to those of Australia.

Resolutions of state failures are notoriously difficult. This holds true for PNG; the 2012 poll may provide a short-term resolution. In the longer-term, however, chronic economic, social and political issues may test state stability. Clearly, prevention remains a more preferable policy option than intervention. The British Government spent over £1.5 billion on its involvement in Bosnia, responding to the aftermath of a crisis. It is a significantly higher amount than the £14 million provided to Macedonia to prevent the development of a crisis.

Australia will feature in a paramount role in dealing with regional state collapse and, more importantly, in a preventive state building capacity. With long established diplomatic and economic ties to Polynesia and Melanesia, Elsina Wainwright goes so far as to refer to Australia as the ‘South Pacific region’s metropole’.  Accordingly, Australia should push for an arbitration role in the current crisis, encouraging both sides to respect the rule of law and democratic norms. Equally, in the long-term, Australia should continue AusAID commitments to the region, with a particular focus on state infrastructure and capacity building projects.

Liam McHugh

Manager

Northern Australia & Energy Security Research Programmes

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