India, China and Japan Co-ordinate Anti-Piracy Patrols

Wednesday, 08 February 2012

Background

The navies of India, China and Japan have announced their intention to co-ordinate their anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. The move is a first for the three countries which, until now, have been conducting their patrols independently of each other and the multinational taskforces deployed to the area. If successful, it will constitute a confidence building measure of the highest order, potentially reducing Sino-Indian tensions elsewhere.

Comment

Recognising a common interest in the security of shipping through the Gulf of Aden, the three countries have pledged to co-ordinate their anti-piracy patrols and escorts in the internationally recognised transit corridor — a 92 kilometre-wide zone of relative safety that runs for 480 nautical miles, or approximately 890 kilometres, between the Red and Arabian Seas. The agreement came into force on 1 January 2012, but was not made public until 2 February.

Prior to the agreement, all three countries had conducted their own patrols. None are part of the multinational Combined Task Force 151, nor had they worked in partnership with the European Union’s Operation Atalanta.

Since 1 January, their co-ordinated patrols have been managed under the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) framework. SHADE is a forum, based in Bahrain, that was established in December 2008 to co-ordinate the anti-piracy operations of the various countries and coalitions involved in the area.

For India and China, the Gulf of Aden agreement represents a considerable step forward in their military co-operation. While their land forces eye each other off over the Actual Line of Control running along their disputed border, their navies are now in a position to demonstrate that the militaries of the two rising powers can work together. Such confidence building measures are extremely rare in Sino-Indian relations. If successful, it will provide a template for future naval co-operation across other Indian Ocean shipping lanes and chokepoints, such as the Strait of Malacca. If so, it would go a long way to reassuring China’s concerns over the vulnerability of its energy imports and assuaging Indian fears of an expanded Chinese naval presence.

Leighton G. Luke

Manager

Indian Ocean Research Programme

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