Background
There have been a number of recent developments in South-East Asia concerning submarine technology. On 18 February, Singapore launched the first of four Invincible-class submarines (Type 218SG) manufactured by Germany, with deliveries expected to begin in 2021. The new submarines will be a significant upgrade to Singapore’s current submarine fleet, which consists of refurbished submarines from the 1960s and 1980s. Indonesia is also planning to further upgrade its submarine capacity in addition to those acquired in 2018. According to Jane’s 360, Indonesia is close to finalising a US$1.2 billion ($1.68 billion) deal with South Korea for three more Nagapasa-class (Type 209/1400) submarines. Finally, Russia is discussing plans with the Philippines to provide Manila with its first ever submarine, possibly within the next few years.
Comment
There are a number of motivating factors behind the acquisition of submarines in South-East Asia; most primarily focussed on protection against possible long-term threats. In the case of Indonesia, as noted in a previous Strategic Weekly Analysis, expanding its submarine capabilities is useful as a response to China’s posturing in the South China Sea. It could also strengthen its navy’s capacity to secure strategic waterways, such as the Malacca Strait. More broadly, submarines can act as a force multiplier for a small navy against a larger naval force. A single submarine warrants a disproportionate response from the surface and, consequently, a significant submarine force could serve as an effective deterrent against potential maritime conflict. Additionally, while the archipelagic layout of countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines could make them vulnerable to naval incursions, that same geography means that submarines would be especially effective in denying access to their waterways.
Given the strategic advantages that a submarine force offers, it is likely that countries in South-East Asia will continue to seek to expand or modernise their submarine capabilities. Those aspirations, however, could be constrained by economic and human capital limitations. The purchase and maintenance of submarines carries steep financial costs and countries with significant submarine forces typically have a large military budget to draw upon. The military budgets of South-East Asian countries are significantly smaller than other major military powers deploying large submarine forces such as China, the United States and Russia. Navies in South-East Asia also suffer from a shortage of personnel due to their policy bias towards land forces. This will make it difficult for them to produce sufficient trained personnel who are equipped to staff new submarines.
While the acquisition of submarines in South-East Asia may increase security against outside forces, it could also increase regional frictions. Submarines that are used for covert operations have the potential to sow distrust between neighbours and could jeopardise peaceful resolutions to border negotiations. As a symptom of this, Thailand has also expressed interest in acquiring more submarines to match the capability of its neighbours. While there is no indication of an arms race as of yet, that trend towards acquisition based on anxieties and insecurities could become problematic for the stability of the region.