Background
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is said to be upgrading a civilian airport in Lhasa in Tibet by constructing a new runway. China also plans to construct three new airports – at Burang, Lhunze, and Tingri – in Southern Tibet as part of its “3 + 1” project. These projects will commence this year and are expected to be completed by 2021. The 3+1 project is one of the five civil aviation development plans for Tibet under the 13th Five-year Plan (2016-2020) and is expected to cost around 16.7 billion yuan ($3.45 billion). According to a semi-official Chinese media report, the project aims to ‘strengthen the border region’s communication with surrounding areas’.
Comment
It is difficult not to place China’s “3 + 1” efforts in the context of its June 2017 stand-off with India at Doklam in the Himalayas. In that year, Indian troops, notified by their Bhutanese counterparts that Chinese Army engineers were constructing a road through territory that Bhutan and China dispute, crossed into foreign territory to prevent that construction. That action led to a stand-off between China and India at Doklam that lasted for 73 days. The confrontation left China, specifically President Xi, embarrassed that Chinese plans were thwarted. As a previous FDI article noted:
What India did, however, was more than merely stop China from constructing a road in disputed territory. It showed the region and beyond, much to the chagrin of China, that a resolute state could indeed withstand the three-warfare strategy that China employs. It also demonstrated that China is not the unstoppable force that much current thinking would imply it is. On the other hand, it would be naïve not to recognise that China was, in its own perception, humiliated; not only at being stopped, but at being stopped by a country it sees as being inferior to it economically and militarily, and one that implicitly questioned the justness of its actions.
The current Chinese projects being undertaken in South Tibet close to the border with India will undoubtedly leave New Delhi with the perception that China is taking steps to mitigate the risk that any future plans would be similarly stopped. While the Global Times report was at pains to emphasise the commercial nature of the airports being upgraded and constructed, it takes little, if any, imagination to note that those same facilities could also have military application if and when required.
The construction of those airports must also be viewed in the context of China’s decision to strengthen its military presence in Tibet. No matter the rationale provided by Beijing for this decision, the fact remains, as New Delhi will perceive it, that Tibet could serve as a launch pad for a future attack on India or, at the very least, a strong deterrent against Indian action similar to that at Doklam.
China has allegedly constructed several new military camps in the border areas, deployed a guided missile unit to Yuxi in Yunnan Province, which is less than a thousand kilometres from India’s Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as its own territory. It has also deployed fast patrol boats to Pangong Tso Lake in Ladakh, territory which is also disputed by the two countries.
New Delhi will also be aware that China is rapidly upgrading its relationship with Russia in an effort to reduce the influence of the US worldwide. If the report that those two countries are now working to attract US allies and potential allies to their camp to achieve that goal is true, India would be a prime candidate for their efforts. New Delhi would view askance, however, China’s military build-up in Tibet and other provinces that are relatively close to India. As the Chinese proverb notes, it is easier to catch flies with honey than with vinegar.
Beijing needs to closely consider whether it wishes to attract India to its side as an equal, or risk pushing New Delhi closer to Washington by continuing with its military build-up along its southern flanks. It needs to decide whether it can afford to have an antagonistic US facing it to the east and a similarly disposed India to the west. China should also be aware that India would likely impose some conditions pertaining to its relationship with Pakistan.
India ought to be concerned by China’s “3 + 1” project and its overall militarisation of Tibet, but China should be equally concerned that it does not push India closer to Washington by furthering that militarisation.